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This paper applies regime-switching methods to the problem of measuring monetary
policy. Policy preferences and structural factors are speciﬁed parametrically as independent
Markov processes. Interaction between the structural and preference parameters in the
policy rule serves to identify the two processes. The estimates uncover policy episodes that
are initiated by switches to “dove regimes,” shown to Granger-cause both NBER recessions
and the Romer dates. These episodes imply real eﬀects of monetary policy that are smaller
than those found in previous studies.
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11 Introduction
Beginning with Hamilton’s (1989) study of business cycle dynamics, regime-switching methods
have proven extremely useful in a wide range of applications in macroeconomics and ﬁnance.1
This approach also holds promise for the measurement of monetary policy, since policy is typi-
cally regarded in terms of ﬂuctuations between persistent regimes involving stronger or weaker
anti-inﬂationary postures. Commonly used vector autoregression (VAR) methods for measuring
policy cannot capture such persistent policy regimes, as these methods can identify only highly
transitory policy shocks.2
This paper conducts an exploratory study of the use of regime switching for estimating mon-
etary policy preferences. Our strategy is to avoid theoretical details by adopting a stylized model
of policy determination that captures inﬂation/unemployment tradeoﬀs in a simple way. This
approach allows for straightforward resolution of estimation issues, and our results may be viewed
as a ﬁrst assessment of the usefulness of regime switching for monetary policy measurement.
The model posits that the policymaker is constrained by a standard expectations augmented
Phillips curve. The Phillips curve contains a parameter that follows a two-state Markov pro-
cess, reﬂecting periodic shifts in the natural rate of unemployment. The policymaker adopts
an inﬂation target that embodies tradeoﬀs between inﬂation and unemployment, captured by
a preference parameter that follows an independent two-state Markov process. The latter pro-
cess switches between a “dove regime,” in which the policymaker more readily accommodates
increases in the natural rate, and a “hawk regime,” in which there is less accommodation. Char-
acterizing the policy process relies on the fact that a rise in the natural rate leads to a larger
increase in the inﬂation target when the preference parameter is in the dove state, relative to the
hawk state. Since the policy process is uncorrelated with the reduced-form residuals, the natural
1See Kim and Nelson (1999) for a survey of regime-switching methods and applications.
2See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for a survey of the large literature that has utilized VAR
methods to measure monetary policy. Within a structural VAR model, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) have utilized
regime switching to measure shifts between the targeting of the federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves.
Recently, Sims (1999) and Rigobon and Sack (2003) have estimated regime-switching models of interest rate
reaction functions. Sims and Zha (2002) and Owyang (2002) have recently considered the Markov-switching in
monetary VARs.
2rate process can be distinguished probabilistically from the policy process, making it possible to
estimate both processes.
Estimates of the model are obtained by means of Gibbs sampling using monthly data over the
period 1965:3 to 1999:2. Highly persistent natural rate and policy processes are estimated, each
having statistically distinct state values. Further, we obtain estimates of the posterior expected
values of both the natural rate and policy parameters over the sample period, providing a picture
of the evolution of natural rate and policy regimes. The policy process, in particular, displays
three “dove episodes”–one each in the late 1960s, mid-1970s, and an interval around 1980. These
episodes correspond closely to the onset of NBER recessions, as well as to the dates identiﬁed
by Romer and Romer (1989,1994) as reﬂecting policy tightening by the Federal Reserve. The
three episodes follow a basic pattern: A switch to the dove regime ﬁrst occurs, followed roughly
a year later by a Romer date and then a recession. A switch back to the hawk regime occurs
after another year. Switches toward the dove regime are shown to Granger-cause both recessions
and the Romer dates. This suggests that monetaryp o l i c yr e g i m e sa r ed r i v e nb ys h i f t st o w a r d
looser policy, initiating a process of policy reversal that takes roughly two years. In other words,
monetary policy is driven by persistent “dove switches.”
The implications of these policy episodes for output, prices, and other variables are assessed
by means of a VAR that treats the estimated posterior expected values of the natural rate and
policy parameters as exogenous variables. Using the estimated VAR, we study the dynamic
eﬀects of a stylized policy episode in which the policy parameter switches to the dove regime for
24 periods and then switches back to the hawk regime. The onset of the dove regime initiates
a steady rise in prices, while output begins to decline after a year. Prices fall after the hawk
regime is restored, and output bottoms out about a year later. The switch to the dove regime
also induces a sharp rise in the federal funds rate, and the federal funds rate jumps upward again
halfway through the dove episode.
The onset of our dove regime shares a number of characteristics with a positive federal funds
rate shock in the standard VAR model, including the increase in price levels following the shock.
3In the present case, however, there is no “price puzzle,” since the switch actually represents a
loosening of policy. Our policy episode generates a signiﬁcantly smaller decline in output than
that associated with federal funds shocks in standard VAR models. Moreover, the cumulative
increase in unemployment associated with the restoration of the hawk regime, relative to the
corresponding reduction of inﬂation (the so-called “sacriﬁce ratio”), is only 0.87, less than half
the value found in previous studies. Overall, our results suggest that the real eﬀects of monetary
policy may be less signiﬁcant than previously believed.
Section 2 presents the model, estimates are given in Section 3, and comparisons with NBER
recessions and the Romer dates are carried out in Section 4. Implications of policy episodes and
the sacriﬁce ratio are considered in Sections 5 and 6, respectively, and Section 7 concludes.
2M o d e l
We adopt a stylized model that focuses on policy tradeoﬀs between inﬂation and unemployment,
in the vein of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). The key innovation
is that the natural rate and monetary policy preferences are speciﬁed parametrically as indepen-




t − πt)+ηt + ε1t, (1)
where πe
t denotes inﬂation expectations of private agents, πt gives realized inﬂation, ηt denotes
the natural rate parameter, and ε1t is a white noise shock. Note that ηt can be interpreted as the




t = γ1πt−1 + γ2πt−2 + ε2t, (2)
where ε2t is a white noise shock. The natural rate parameter ηt follows a two-state Markov
process, taking on values
− →
h =( h1,h 2),w i t hh1 <h 2.L e tΓη indicate the matrix of transition
4probabilities for the natural rate process.
Realized inﬂation is determined by
πt = πt + ε3t,( 3 )
where πt indicates the inﬂation target set by a policymaker and ε3t is a white noise shock reﬂecting
control error.3 We assume that the policy target responds to underlying policymaker preferences
that embody desired tradeoﬀs between inﬂation and unemployment. Policy preferences and
parameters of the Phillips curve interact in a manner that imposes restrictions on the policy
target.
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of these restrictions. The negatively sloped lines in the ﬁgure
give expected unemployment, ut, as a function of the policy target πt, derived from (1) and
(3). These lines serve as constraints on the policymaker. Under a dove policy regime, the
policymaker’s preferences place relatively greater weight on reducing unemployment. Thus, a rise
in the natural rate from h1 to h2 shifts the policy outcome from point A to point B.U n d e rah a w k
regime, in contrast, reducing inﬂation receives relatively greater weight, and correspondingly the
policy outcome shifts from point C to point D when the natural rate rises. Thus, a switch in
the natural rate state induces larger changes in inﬂation relative to unemployment when the
p o l i c y m a k e ri si nt h ed o v er e g i m e ,c o m p a r e dw i t ht h eh a w kr e g i m e .
To capture this basic relationship between preferences and structure, we adopt the following
speciﬁcation of the policy rule:
πt = αt(kπ
e
t + ηt), (4)
where αt gives the policy preference parameter.4 Assume that αt follows a two-state Markov
process, taking on values − → a =( a1,a 2),w i t ha1 <a 2.5 The matrix of transition probabilities is
3According to (3), the policymaker can use its policy instruments to freely adjust the level of inﬂation, up to
a white noise control error. Thus, there is no inﬂation inertia assumed in our model.
4The policy rule (4) can be derived, e.g., from a quadratic policymaker loss function with a weight on unem-
ployment that is an increasing function of αt.
5It is important to note that the αt process captures changes in the stance of policy that are not driven
5given by Γα. Note that the higher-valued state, a2, indicates the dove regime, since for αt = a2
an increase in either the natural rate state or expected inﬂation leads to a larger rise in the
inﬂation target.
Combining (3) and (4), we have
πt = αt(kπ
e
t + ηt)+ε3t.( 5 )
Equations (1), (2), and (5) comprise the complete model. The model has the important feature
that, as a consequence of the restrictions implied by (4), the posterior distribution of the path of
inﬂation, conditional on any realized path of the natural rate parameter, ηt, will vary depending
o nt h er e a l i z e dp a t ho ft h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r ,αt. In particular, a switch in αt produces a
change in the policy target, and thus in realized inﬂation, that is independent of changes in ηt.
An “omitted variables type" estimation problem arises in this context, in that the underlying
natural rate variable, ηt,e n t e r sb o t ht h ei n ﬂation and unemployment equations. The presence
of independent switching in both the natural rate and policy preference variables resolves the
problem by allowing us to distinguish the eﬀects of the shift in the natural rate variable from
the reduced-form residuals.6 Because of this, the two processes are identiﬁed.7
3E s t i m a t e s
The model is estimated using Gibbs sampling; the appendix describes details of the estimation
procedure.8 We use monthly data on inﬂation and unemployment over the period 1965:3 to
by changes in the state of the economy. Thus, while the policymaker can respond to changes in expected
unemployment (since kπe
t +ηt enters the policy rule), the parameter αt must itself be independent of ηt in order
to be estimated.
6Note that, by assumption, αt is uncorrelated with the shock to the unemployment rate, ε1t.
7The reduced form of the model outlined in this section assumes no contemporaneous feedback from unemploy-
ment to inﬂation and from either unemployment or inﬂation to expectations. Given these exclusion restrictions,
the shocks ε1t, ε2t,a n dε3t are also identiﬁed under our assumptions. Rigobon (2003) proposes an alternative
methodology for identifying these shocks in the Markov-switching environment without exclusion restrictions.
We do not consider the impact of these shocks in this paper, however.
8Casella and George (1992), Albert and Chib (1993), and Kim and Nelson (1999) provide references on Gibbs
sampling.
61999:2, taken from Citibase.9 The Gibbs sampler produces estimates of the model parameters
k, γ1,a n dγ2, along with state values and transition matrices for the two Markov processes and
the variances of the three white noise shocks. In addition, we obtain estimates of the posterior
probabilities of the natural rate and preference states in each period, conditional on the full
sample.
Parameter estimates are reported in Table 1. Of the estimated parameters, only the variance
o ft h ew h i t en o i s es h o c ki nt h ei n ﬂation expectations function, σ2
ε2, and the weight on the second
lag of inﬂation in that function, γ2,a r en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Speciﬁcally, esti-
mated values for each state of the natural rate and preference processes are signiﬁcant at the 95
percent level. Moreover, for each process the estimated state values are distinct at the 95 percent
level. The table also shows estimated values of diagonal elements of the transition matrices, Γη
and Γα. Observe that these estimates lie very close to unity, indicating that the natural rate and
preference processes are highly persistent.
The estimates of h1 and h2 indicate that the economy ﬂuctuates between a “low natural rate”
state, in which the natural rate of unemployment is about 3.3 percent, and a “high natural rate”
state, in which the natural rate is 6.7 percent. Since the estimated values of the preference states
a1 and a2 are positive, it follows that the policymaker accommodates increases in the natural
rate under both the dove and hawk regimes.
Quantitative implications for inﬂation may be assessed by computing the steady-state ex-
pected inﬂation rates implied by the model, where steady states are determined by holding the
state proﬁle (hi,a i) ﬁxed for all time and setting πe
t = E[πt].S t e a d y - s t a t ei n ﬂation rates for each
state proﬁle are reported in Table 2. Observe that inﬂation is higher in the high natural rate
state, compared with the low natural rate state, and it is higher in the dove regime, compared
with the hawk regime. Moving to the high natural rate state produces a larger rise in inﬂation
when policy preferences are in the dove regime, consistent with (4). Further, changes in the
preference state have a larger quantitative eﬀect on inﬂation than do changes in the natural rate
9Inﬂation data are the seasonally adjusted, annualized rate of change of CPI-U. Unemployment is measured
by the seasonally adjusted, annualized rate of unemployment in the United States.
7state.
Note from Table 1 that γ1+γ2 ' 1. Thus, according to (2), private agents’ inﬂation expecta-
tions converge to rational expectations if the natural rate and policy states remain unchanged for
as u ﬃciently long time. Our results imply that important departures from rational expectations
occur only during transitions following regime switches. Moreover, γ1 lies very close to unity,
indicating that expectations adjust quite rapidly following a switch.
Posterior expected values for the natural rate and preference parameters can be computed by
multiplying the estimated state values by the posterior state probabilities generated by the Gibbs
sampler. For example, the posterior expected value of the natural rate parameter in period t is
given by
E[ηt|e yT, e ϕ]=h1 Pr[ηt = h1|e yT, e ϕ]+h2 Pr[ηt = h2|e yT, e ϕ],
where e yT indicates the inﬂation and unemployment data over the full sample and e ϕ gives the
estimated parameter vector. Figure 2 reports estimated posterior expected values of the natural
rate parameter, graphed along with the inﬂation and unemployment data.10 Observe that the
sample period begins in the low natural rate state. A switch to the high natural rate state occurs
near the end of 1970, coinciding with an oil price increase episode identiﬁed by Hamilton (1983).
The high natural rate state persists until mid-1997, when a switch back to the low natural rate
state is observed.11
Estimated posterior expected values for the policy preference parameter are shown in Figure
3. The hawk regime predominates for most of the sample, but there are three major dove
episodes–one each in the late 1960s, mid-1970s, and an interval around 1980. As may be seen in
the ﬁgure, inﬂation tends to be higher on average during the dove episodes, while switches back
t ot h eh a w kr e g i m ec o i n c i d ew i t hl o w e ri n ﬂation and sharp increases in unemployment. The next
section oﬀers further interpretations of the posterior expected policy parameter.
10Estimates for the posterior probabilities for the process governing the structural state are consistent with
those estimated in the literature (e.g., Gordon, 1997).
11The estimates are roughly consistent with Shimer’s (1998) argument that demographic factors induced an
extended rise in the natural rate beginning in the early 1970s.
8In summary, we obtain estimates of distinct, highly persistent processes for the natural rate
and preference parameters. The estimated state values imply quantitatively important eﬀects
on the levels of inﬂation and unemployment generated by the model. Posterior expected values
of the natural rate and policy parameters uncover switches that occur on a number of occasions
over the sample period.
4 NBER Recessions and Romer Dates
The posterior expectation of the policy parameter, shown in Figure 3, indicates numerous shifts
in the monetary policy regime. In this section we relate these shifts to NBER recessions and the
Romer dates. The latter are dates, identiﬁed by Romer and Romer (1989,1994), at which the
Fed declared an intent “to exert a contractionary inﬂuence on the economy in order to reduce
inﬂation” (1989, p. 134).
Five NBER recessions and ﬁve Romer dates lie within the sample period we consider. Figure
4 graphs the recessions and Romer dates, along with the posterior expected value of the policy
parameter. Observe that recessions tend to coincide with the latter parts of the dove episodes,
with reversions to the hawk regime occurring near the end of recessions. Further, four of the
ﬁve Romer dates occur shortly after switches to the dove regime. Reversion to the hawk regime
occurs soon after these Romer dates. Based on the graph, there appears to be a close relationship
between NBER recessions, the Romer dates, and the policy regime switches that we identify.
A more objective assessment of the relationship between these variables can be obtained by
testing for Granger causality. For this purpose, we construct two variables from our posterior
expected policy series, an “upward switch” variable, ust, and a “downward switch” variable, dst,
deﬁned as follows:
ust =m a x {E[αt] − E[αt−1],0},
dst =m a x {−(E[αt] − E[αt−1]),0},
9where E[αt] indicates the posterior expected value of the policy parameter. We capture the onset
of NBER recessions by means of a variable Nt, which has the value unity for the initial month
of each of the ﬁve recessions in the sample and zero for the remaining months. The Romer dates
are indicated by a series Rt having a value of unity for the ﬁve Romer dates and zero for the
other months.
We ﬁrst regress Nt on 24 lags of Nt and ust and then rerun the regression excluding the ust
lags. Table 3 reports the results of an F test for this exclusion restriction. Observe that the
high F value of 1.968 and the associated p-value of 0.004 indicate that the lags of ust are highly
signiﬁcant for predicting Nt. The table also reports the results of the reverse exercise, and the
values F =0 .848 and p =0 .674 show that Nt does not help to predict ust. This provides strong
statistical evidence that the upward switches in our measured posterior expected policy series
Granger-cause NBER recessions. The reverse relationship holds when recessions are related to
the downward switches: dst does not help predict Nt (F =0 .259, p =0 .999), while Nt is highly
signiﬁcant in predicting dst (F =5 .150, p =0 .000). Thus, NBER recessions Granger-cause the
downward switches.
Turning to the Romer dates, it can be observed in Table 3 that ust helps to predict Rt;
however, the reverse is not true, meaning that the upward switches Granger-cause the Romer
dates. The relationship between the Romer dates and downward switches is less clear. Table 3
shows that dst is of no help in predicting Rt, while Rt has little explanatory power for dst.T h u s ,
the data do not reveal any clear causal relationship between Rt and dst.
We conclude that the onset of dove regimes, as measured by upward switches in the posterior
expectation of the policy parameter, can be viewed as a driving force behind both NBER reces-
sions and the policy initiatives observed by the Romers. This suggests a new interpretation of
policy episodes since the mid-1960s. Beginning in the hawk regime, a policy episode is initiated
by a switch to the dove regime. Roughly a year after this switch, policymakers begin to express
clear intent to tighten policy, based on fears of inﬂation. Close to this time a recession ensues.
A little over a year later, the intent becomes realized in the form of a switch back to the hawk
10regime. In the next two sections we assess the implications of this stylized pattern for a range of
macroeconomic variables.
5 Implications of Policy Episodes
In this section we consider the dynamic implications for output, prices, and other variables of
the policy episodes discussed in the preceding section. To begin, we estimate a standard VAR
model consisting of ﬁve endogenous variables, including industrial production, the implicit price
deﬂator for consumption expenditures, the federal funds rate, the ratio of nonborrowed reserves
to total reserves, and M1.12 Natural logs of all variables except the federal funds rate are taken,
and each variable is regressed on 11 lags of the ﬁve endogenous variables, along with the current
value and 11 lags of the posterior expected values of the natural rate and policy parameters
(these are the series graphed in Figures 2 and 3).
Given the estimated VAR, we conduct the following policy experiment. We set the value of
the posterior expected natural rate parameter equal to its unconditional expected value 5.85 for
all periods and compute the steady state associated with the hawk regime, where the posterior
expected policy parameter is equal to 0.58 in each period. Beginning in this hawk steady state,
the policy variable is increased to the dove regime value of 1.43 for 24 months, after which it
is returned to the hawk regime value of 0.58 for all future periods. Thus, we simulate a policy
episode initiated by a switch to the dove regime, followed by a switch back to the hawk regime.
Observe from Figure 3 that the three identiﬁed dove episodes average about two years in length,
so that the simulation can be viewed as a typical episode.13
Results are given in Figure 5. In this ﬁgure, the dove regime begins in period 13 and ends
in period 36. Output as measured by industrial production remains ﬂat for the ﬁrst year of the
12We thank Charles Evans for providing these data.
13It is important to note that this policy experiment diﬀers from the conventional VAR analysis of the response
to a policy shock. Instead, we are analyzing the eﬀect of a change in the policymaker’s desired inﬂation-output
tradeoﬀ, αt. The former measures the eﬀect of a one-time innovation to the policy target, while the latter
measures a persistent change in the policy rule. Essentially, we are calculating the transition dynamics between
policy states (from tight monetary policy to loose and then back to tight) for a given natural rate of unemployment.
11dove regime, while prices rise steadily. About halfway through the dove regime, output begins
to decline sharply. Interestingly, this coincides roughly with the Romer dates occurring about
halfway through the dove episodes depicted in Figure 4. Once the hawk regime takes hold in
period 37, prices begin to fall, and output bottoms out about a year after restoration of the hawk
regime.
Notice further that when the dove regime hits, there is an upward spike in the federal funds
rate, while the nonborrowed reserve ratio declines and M1 begins a gradual upward movement.
A little under halfway through the dove regime there is another upward spike of the federal
funds rate, and the rate remains well above its hawk steady-state value (by over 5 percentage
points) for the remainder of the dove regime. After the second spike in the federal funds rate,
the nonborrowed reserve ratio begins to increase, while the rise in M1 levels oﬀ. Once the hawk
regime is restored, the federal funds rate gradually falls.
These ﬁndings suggest a number of interpretations. Note ﬁrst of all that the switch initiating
t h ed o v ep o l i c ye p i s o d eg e n e r a t e sar e s p o n s em u c hl i k et h a to fap o s i t i v ef e d e r a lf u n d sr a t es h o c k
in the standard VAR policy analysis: An upward spike in the federal funds rate is followed by a
gradual rise in prices, a downward movement in nonborrowed reserves, and a decline in output.14
From our perspective, the increase in prices following the shock does not constitute a “price
puzzle,” since the switch actually represents a loosening of policy.15 Output responds with a lag
in our setting because of lags in the reversal of policy.
The initial upward movement of the federal funds rate may be understood as a response to
higher anticipated inﬂation. As policymakers respond to the increase in inﬂation, the federal
funds rate rises again and the nonborrowed reserve ratio begins to increase. Thus, our results
conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that the federal funds rate serves as an important instrument for
14See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999, p. 90) for a standard VAR analysis at monthly frequency
that displays these characteristics. Our results depart from the VAR ﬁndings, however, in predicting a rise in M1
following the switch.
15A pair of papers has recently reinvestigated the price puzzle for conventionally-deﬁned federal funds rate
shocks. Using a structural VAR with a single break date, Hanson (2003) argues that in the post-Volcker era, the
price puzzle is virtually nonexistent. Francis and Owyang (2003) show that, in a Markov-switching vector error
correction model, the price puzzle is statistically insigniﬁcant for all eras.
12implementing the anti-inﬂationary policy. Further, contractionary policy appears to entail a rise
in the nonborrowed reserve ratio, contrary to the suggestion of Strongin (1995).
Finally, the overall policy episode leads to a smaller decline in output than that found in
previous studies. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), for example, utilize standard VAR
methods to show that a policy shock generating an 80-basis-point rise in the federal funds rate
reduces output by about 0.5 percent after two years. Our policy episode, in contrast, implies a
much larger increase in the federal funds rate, accompanied by a smaller decline in output.
Our approach has the key advantage that we are able to measure shifts in the policy regime
that induce persistent changes in policy, i.e., we measure a systematic component of policy.
This allows us to ask whether monetary policy aﬀects the economy only through unanticipated
changes, or instead whether persistent changes in the policy regime can have an eﬀect. To assess
this issue, we carry out a policy simulation in which the policy variable takes on the dove value
of 1.43 for a single period only, with the hawk value being maintained for all other periods.
Thus, only the switch itself, which is the unanticipated part of the policy episode, can have an
eﬀect. Figure 6 compares this “one-shot” policy switch to the persistent 24-month dove episodes
considered earlier. Observe that the one-shot policy episode has a tiny eﬀect on output and
prices when compared with the persistent episode; results are similar for the other variables. It
follows that the systematic component of policy, captured here as a persistent policy state, has
an important eﬀect on real variables that goes beyond the eﬀect of the unanticipated component.
6S a c r i ﬁce Ratio
A range of studies have used Phillips curve frameworks to assess the unemployment eﬀects of
disinﬂationary policies.16 These studies have constructed “sacriﬁce ratios” that measure the
cumulative increase in unemployment associated with each percentage point of policy-induced
inﬂation reduction. In particular, there is a rough consensus that a 1 percent reduction in
16For example, see Okun (1978), Gordon and King (1982), Blinder (1987), and Ball (1994).
13inﬂation increases cumulative unemployment by at least 2 percentage points per year.
Our model can be used to measure the cost of disinﬂation by considering the eﬀects of switches
from the dove to the hawk regime. For this purpose, we estimate a VAR having two endogenous
variables, the inﬂation and unemployment rates used in the original estimation. Each variable is
regressed on 11 lags of the two endogenous variables, along with the current value and 11 lags of
the posterior expected values of the natural rate and policy parameters. Using these estimates,
we reconsider the policy experiment analyzed in the preceding section: Beginning in the hawk
steady state, the policy parameter switches to the dove regime for 24 periods, then switches back
to the hawk regime.
Results are shown in Figure 7. During the dove episode, the inﬂation rate averages 6.74
percent higher than in the hawk steady state, while the unemployment rate goes down by about
half a percentage point. After the hawk preferences are restored, inﬂation returns (somewhat
erratically) to the hawk steady-state level, while a large increase in unemployment ensues. In
p a r t i c u l a r ,u n e m p l o y m e n tp e a k so n ey e a ra f t e rt h es w i t c hb a c kt ot h eh a w kr e g i m e ,a ta b o u t2
percentage points above the hawk steady-state level.
The sacriﬁce ratio implied by these results can be calculated as follows. Beginning in the
last six months of the dove regime, when unemployment rises above the hawk steady-state value,
the cumulative increase in years of unemployment over the next four years amounts to 5.88
percentage points. Since inﬂation falls by 6.74 percent as a result of the disinﬂation policy, the
implied value of the sacriﬁce ratio is 0.87, or less than half of the consensus ﬁgure.
Our ﬁnding of a low sacriﬁce ratio can be comprehended in terms of our parameter estimates.
In Phillips curve models, high costs of disinﬂation emerge when unemployment is highly sensitive
to inﬂation surprises, or when inﬂation expectations are slow to adjust to a new disinﬂationary
regime. However, our estimate of k =0 .747 indicates that unemployment is aﬀected only slightly
by inﬂation surprises. Moreover, since γ1 =0 .9772, adjustment of expectations is extremely
rapid. Both of these factors militate against disinﬂation costs and support the ﬁnding of a low
14sacriﬁce ratio.17
An alternative perspective on the costs of disinﬂation can be gained by considering the policy
episode as a whole. Beginning in period 13, the switch to the dove regime and back to the hawk
regime generates a cumulative increase in years of unemployment of 5.51 percent over six years.
Thus, unemployment reductions obtained early in the dove phase are more than oﬀset by the
higher unemployment needed to restore the hawk steady state. The initial switch to the dove
regime implies a highly unfavorable tradeoﬀ, in that very large increases in inﬂation yield only
slight reductions in unemployment.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we apply regime-switching techniques to the measurement of monetary policy
regimes. Using a stylized model of inﬂation/unemployment policy tradeoﬀs, we obtain estimates
that reveal highly persistent processes of policy preferences and economic structure, switching
between distinct states. The estimated posterior expected values of the policy parameter trace
o u te p i s o d e si n v o l v i n gs w i t c h e st oad o v er e g i m ef o ra b o u tt w oy e a r s ,f o l l o w e db yr e v e r s i o nt o
a hawk regime. The switches that initiate these episodes Granger-cause both NBER recessions
and the Romer dates, suggesting that incidents of monetary tightening might be best regarded
as responses to earlier dove shocks. Our estimated policy episodes imply smaller eﬀects on real
variables than have been obtained in previous studies using diﬀerent policy measures.
Our model may be extended to allow regime switches to depend on the duration of regimes
or economic variables. The methodology can be applied to a broader set of variables that may
inﬂuence policymaker preferences, including employment, output, and ﬁnancial market variables
such as interest rates, and it may be applied to other countries. Policymaker objectives may be
17Past estimates of structural models by Sargent (1976), Fair (1979), and Broadbent and Barro (1997) have
found low values of the parameter relating unemployment to inﬂation surprises, although our estimate is even
smaller. In a model incorporating both forward- and backward-looking expectations, Galí and Gertler (1999) have
found that backward-looking expectations are quantitatively unimportant, suggesting that expectations adjust
rapidly in the aggregate.
15combined with policy instruments to create a synthetic analysis linking policy regimes with the
particular instruments used to implement these regimes.
We have relied on a bare-bones natural rate model that has allowed us to obtain sharp
estimates, but that also raises valid questions of robustness. A more theoretically complete
model would incorporate explicit utility maximization by a forward-looking policymaker, lags
in implementation of policy targets, and a richer structure of expectation formation by private
agents. The econometric implementation of such a model represents a challenging and, in view
of our results, potentially fruitful avenue for future research.
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Deﬁne state vectors St and Zt such that ηt =
− →











e ST deﬁnes the vector of states e ST =( S1,S 2,...,ST), where T indicates the length of the sample
and e ZT, e π
e
T,a n de yT are deﬁned similarly. The vector of model parameters is given by e ϕ =








































and µt = γ1πt−1 + γ2πt−2.
The objective of the Gibbs sampler is to characterize the joint density p(e ST, e ZT,e π
e
T, e ϕ|e yT)
using the ergotic distribution of a Markov simulation of the following conditional joint densities
17that are generated iteratively:
p(e π
e
T|e yT, e ST, e ZT, e ϕ),
p(e ZT|e yT, e ST,e π
e
T, e ϕ),
p(e ST|e yT,e π
e
T, e ZT, e ϕ),
p(e ϕ|e yT, e ST, e ZT,e π
e
T).
Samples from these densities are drawn at each step and used to generate the other densities,
constituting a Markov chain. After an appropriate number of iterations, the ergotic distribution
of this chain of conditional densities is the joint density p(e ST, e ZT,e π
e
t, e ϕ|e yT).18
Conditional Density of Inﬂation Expectations.
The conditional density p(e π
e
T|e yT, e ST, e ZT, e ϕ) can be obtained by applying a Kalman ﬁlter
modiﬁed for the presence of the two Markov processes that govern ηt and αt.T h e K a l m a n
ﬁlter produces the densities p(πe
t|e yt, e St, e Zt, e ϕ) for all t. Given some initial conditions πe
t−1|t−1 and





































18Reference on the convergence of the sampling algorithm can be found in Gelfand and Smith (1990) and
Geweke (1992).
18Then rewrite p(e π
e
T|e yT, e ST, e ZT, e ϕ) as
p(e π
e
T|e yT, e ST, e ZT, e ϕ)=p(π
e





t|e yt, e St, e Zt, e ϕ,π
e
t+1).
The ﬁnal iteration of the Kalman ﬁlter provides the ﬁrst term. Elements of the second term are









where Q = σ2
ε2, πe
t|t = p(πe
t|e yt, e ST, e ZT, e ϕ),a n dVt|t is the conditional variance as determined by
the Kalman ﬁlter.
Conditional Densities of Policy and Natural Rate States.
Recall that, conditional on e yT, e ST, e π
e
T,a n de ϕ, (5) is linear in e ZT.G i v e n p(Z0|e y0),ap r i o r
probability for the initial state, the Hamilton (1989) ﬁlter generates the conditional density
p(ZT|e yT, e ST, e π
e
T, e ϕ). Then, following Carter and Kohn (1994) and Kim and Nelson (1998), the
density p(e ZT|e yT, e ST,e π
e
T, e ϕ) is obtained from
p(e ZT|e yT, e ST,e π
e





p(Zt|e yT, e ST,e π
e
T, e ϕ,Zt+1). (6)
Each density p(Zt|e yT, e ST,e π
e
T, e ϕ,Zt+1) is generated from a ﬁltering algorithm and Bayes’ Law:
p(Zt|e yT, e ST,e π
e
T, e ϕ,Zt+1)=
p(Zt+1|e yt,Z t, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ)p(Zt|e yt, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ)









p(Zt+1|e yt,Z t, e St,e π
e













where p(Zt+1|Zt) is the transition probability and the ﬁlter determines the density p(Zt|e yt, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ).
The ﬁrst equation is simply an application of Bayes’ Law. The ﬁnal two arise from the Markov
property of Zt: In determining the density for Zt+1, the only relevant information in the available
s e ti st h ep r e v i o u ss t a t eZt. The numerator in (6) is calculated from the Hamilton ﬁlter as
p(Zt|e yt, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ)=
f(yt|e yt−1,Z t, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ)p(Zt|e yt−1, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ)




f(yt|e yt−1,Z t, e St,e π
e





f(yt|e yt−1,Z t, e St,e π
e










p(Zt|Zt−1)p(Zt−1|e yt−1, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ).
The density p(Zt−1|e yt−1, e St,e π
e
t, e ϕ) is taken from the previous iteration. The conditional density
p(e ST|e yT,e π
e
T, e ZT, e ϕ) can be generated using a similar process.
Conditional Density of the Parameter Vector.
The conditional densities for the elements of the parameter vector are generated by employing
Bayesian OLS. The Bayesian posterior distribution for each element of e ϕ, conditional on all other
elements of e ϕ, can be determined given a prior distribution. If model parameters, excluding the
variances and transition probabilities, have prior distributions of the form p0(ϕi) ∼ N(ai,A iσ2),
then their corresponding posterior conditional distributions are given by



















iXi)−1, Xi is the appropriate regressor,
and Yi is a forecast error. For example, consider estimating the values of the vector − → a in (5).
In this case, deﬁne Xα = B b ZT and Yα = e πT,w h e r et h er o wt on-diagonal element of B is
20− → ηT ηSt−1 +kπe
t and the oﬀ-diagonal elements are zero, b ZT =[ e z1T,e z2T],a n de ziT is a T ×1 vector
with representative element zit =1iﬀ Zi = i. Other elements of the parameter vector can
be estimated similarly. The values for the vector
− →
h can be generated from a posterior normal













e uT − k(e π
e
T − e πT)






where b ST is deﬁned similarly to b ZT.





















δ1 =( e uT − k(e π
e
T − e πT) −
− →
h e ST)
0(e uT − k(e π
e
T − e πT) −
− →
h e ST);













δi =( e πt − − → a e Zt(
− →
h e St + ke π
e
t))
0(e πt − − → a e Zt(
− →




Given a prior probability distribution for Γa
ii of the form Γa
ii ∼ β(uii,u ji) for j 6= i,t h e
distribution for the transition probabilities Γa
ii is determined by
Γ
a
ii =P r [ αt = ai|αt−1 = ai] ∼ β(uii + nii,u ji + nji),
where nii is the number of periods that αt remained in state i and nji is the number of periods
21that αt switched to state j 6= i after beginning in state i. Then the other elements of Γα can be
determined by Γα
ji =1− Γα
ii. A similar procedure is used to generate the elements of Γη.
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Table 1. Estimated Parameters 
 
Note: Standard deviations across iterations are given in parentheses. 
  
State in t Inflation Rate
 










































































Posterior Expected Values of Preference Parameter  
 



















































































































































































































Posterior Expected Values of Structural Parameter 
 
 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of Inflation Episode 
 
 